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COMMAND POLICY

THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY POSTURE & NATIONAL POLICY

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Military Posture & National Power



By Gen. David C. Jones, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

In his posture statement last year, my predecessor and good friend, the late Gen. George S. Brown, made a persuasive case that, despite the modest recent upturn in U.S. Defense spending, the military risk to the nation was increasing. The thrust of this, my first formal report to Congress as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is essentially the same. The major difference is that the adverse trends which he described (and which have been cited with increasing concern by senior uniformed military authorities for over a decade) have edged us another year closer to a potentially unstable and acutely dangerous imbalance in U.S.-U.S.S.R. military capability.

For many years, some have considered the prospect and consequences of such an imbalance either imaginary, meaningless, or so remote as to be unworthy of serious concern in the face of more pressing and immediate problems. Too often, those who spoke out on the implications of Soviet military preponderance have been dismissed as alarmists or as self-serving "pitchmen" engaged in a bureaucratic contest for larger Defense budgets. The rationale for this dismissal has usually been along the lines that, "It's the same story year after year—current capability adequate, but trends bad and future gloomy—but the intelligence estimates are always pessimistic and that distant and ominous future never seems to materialize."

Regrettably, the record shows that we have tended to underestimate Soviet forces and programs far more often than we have overestimated them and, while we have been preoccupied with other issues and hoping for reciprocity for U.S. weapons restraint, that "ominous" future has been getting steadily nearer. Its outlines are now beginning to come into sharp focus and, as the senior U.S. military officer, I must express my serious concerns over the picture I see.

Unfortunately, much of the public discussion on the subject of military balance is couched in the stark and oversimplified terms of stable peace versus impending war. Realistically, although the potential for confrontation and conflict among nations remains all too high, it is hard to imagine any country seriously pursuing a policy that is consciously premised on engaging in nuclear warfare. Moreover, framing the question this way obscures the more fundamental issues of power, influence, national interests, and stability which I believe should frame our dialogue on strategy and defense posture.

In this latter context, I believe the days ahead may well be some

of the most difficult we have ever faced. With each passing month, I grow increasingly apprehensive about the severity of the challenges ahead and about the direction, pace, and strength of our responses in some critical areas.

Even the most optimistic observer is compelled to conclude that, for a variety of reasons, the U.S. power position has declined over the past three decades. We emerged from World War II "on top" in almost every respect: economically unequaled; the dollar stable; industrially and technologically the acknowledged leader; militarily strong and victorious. We had a unity of purpose and spirit. At home, we were productive, progressive, and enterprising; to the world at large we were seen as builders, doers and helpers. After a period of policy formulation following World War II, we maintained a steady momentum toward our goals for a long time.

It has been some years since that balance sheet has presented such a "bullish" picture—though it would be impossible to pinpoint a single period or event which signaled the change in direction and the slackening of the pace. We have tended, over the years, to disbelieve the evidence of slowly gathering clouds on the horizon. Somehow, we seem to have become distracted by complacency and by the more immediate concerns of the moment.

Even the oil embargo of 1973 awakened us only momentarily, and we continue to consume—and often waste—natural resources as if they were limitless. Americans have not faced up to the fact that the days ahead will carry us inexorably from plenty to pinch to crunch, with all the economic problems and potential for conflict that implies.

Another concern is that our industrial productivity is down in relative terms, and therefore our balance of trade in low-technology manufactured goods is very unfavorable. Our favorable balance in high-technology industries has long helped to offset our deficits, but even here we see some adverse trends.

U.S. patents are down. Investments in innovation, invention, research—the slow yeast of future prosperity—have been deferred, delayed and reduced in many areas.

All of these problems—resources, productivity, technological slowdown—need priority attention, and I would hope that the efforts underway within the government and private sectors to try to solve these problems are successful.

Other external factors, such as the postwar economic and industrial resurgence of Western Europe and Japan, have also contributed to an inevitable decline in the degree of influence which the United States exerted on world affairs in mid-century. The period of heightened nationalism, resource competition, and interdependence has further diffused political and economic decisionmaking and reduced the power of any single nation to determine the course of other nations' policies.

For all these evolutionary and revolutionary changes, the United States remains the premier world power. Nevertheless, we face many challenges in the political, diplomatic, economic and social areas, all of which have implications for national security in the broadest meaning of the term. Even if there were no global competition from the Soviet Union, we would still have a full plate of serious problems to solve in order to sustain our way of life.

This Soviet competition is a fact of life, however, and for more than a decade it has been assuming an increasingly ominous character. Its most worrisome feature from my viewpoint is the steady, relentless, concentration on building offensive military power.

The direction and momentum of this growth, far out of proportion to any rational calculation of their defense needs, gives me cause for deep concern. The Soviet power position needs a serious and balanced examination to be sure we do not overreact or underreact to a partial perception of their strength.

We must recognize, first of all, that the Soviets have some very serious problems to deal with:

- Their gross national product (GNP) growth rate shows signs of serious stagnation.



DEFENSE NEWS BRIEFS

Family Housing Program

DoD is not proposing construction of new family housing units during FY 80 because: the deficit has been reduced to 10,000 units; there's considerable ongoing construction from previous years; and budgetary constraints apply to family housing as well, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) Perry J. Fliakas who testified before a House Armed Services Subcommittee in April.

The Pentagon's housing director pointed out two important policy points—that family separation caused by lack of suitable housing can adversely affect morale and welfare and that primary reliance is placed upon private housing in communities near military installations, with the Government addressing remaining housing deficiencies.

Long Term View of Base Realignments

Between January 1969 and December 1978, the Department of Defense had announced more than 3,600 separate actions, eliminating 382,000 military and 252,000 civilian positions, thereby avoiding about $5.6 billion in annual expenditures.

Presenting these statistics to a House Appropriations Subcommittee this Spring, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan Jr., pointed out many of these saved resources have been used to increase combat effectiveness and readiness of our military forces.

In this regard, he cited the Army for raising its divisional total by three to 16, the Air Force for continuing efforts to equip 26 tactical air wings, and the Navy for being able to increase its manning on ships.

"All this has been done without a significant increase in manpower," he said.

New Planes In The Air Force

Tactical Air Command is gaining some 324 new generation aircraft, F-15s, F-16, A-10s at MacDill AFB and Homestead AFB in Florida, England AFB, La., and Nellis AFB, Nev.

As usual, the planes being replaced in the active units—in this case, F-4s, RF-4s, and A-7s—are being sent to Air Reserve and Air National Guard outfits, representing yet another reequipping with superior aircraft types.

Computer Training Aids

Computer-based instruction can save 25 percent of the time required by students to complete the same courses given by conventional instruction without any change in student achievement at training school, according to the testimony of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Ruth M. Davis before a House Armed Services Subcommittee early this spring.

Moreover, the Army recently put such trainees in realistic field exercises, matching the computer-trained against the conventionally trained with the new Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement (MILES) system, she said.

The results: the computer-trained showed an increase of about 50 percent in detection of hostile targets, 25 percent increase in enemy kills, and about 50 percent reduction in casualties due to the enemy.

These developments have led to the establishment of a single, tri-service Technology Advisory Coordination Group (TAG) to work on four major areas: (1) human factors; (2) simulation and training devices; (3) education and training; (4) manpower and personnel.

Civilian Employment Prospects

DoD plans to reduce civilian employment some 32,000 during FY-79 and FY-80.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) Robert B. Pirie told a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee last month that about two-thirds of the 32,000 reductions will come from contracting for work that can be done as well and cheaper by private business.

He noted too the gradual conversion of civilian technicians in the Guard and Reserve to full-time Guardsmen and Reservists.

- They have chronic agricultural problems making them heavily dependent on imports.
- They are the largest producers of oil in the world today, but many predict that they will become net importers by the 1980s. Whatever happens in this regard, they will have to invest a great deal of capital and technology to lift the oil from the frozen tundra and transport it west of the Urals.
- They have serious social problems. They face prospects of a declining work force in the 1980s, as well as a shifting ethnic and nationality balance which is likely to create further internal tensions.

Abroad, the picture is not all that rosy either. The Soviets feel very acutely the pressure of a billion Chinese at their back door. They see a need to deploy large and expensive forces on the Chinese border. Even their grip in Eastern Europe is not assured without heavy repressive measures; the Soviets have long memories and their experiences in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have taught them that there are seeds of dissension always ready to sprout. Among its allies, the Soviet Union can count some bargain-hunters and many hangers-on, but few real friends.

Taking into account all these vulnerabilities and weaknesses, we must still face the cold, hard fact of the priority in people and other resources they accord to military power.

Despite their manpower squeeze, they have more than four million men under arms—more

than twice the number we have. They commit an estimated 11-13 percent of their GNP to national defense—and some respected analysts believe even this estimate may be low. In contrast, the United States spends only about five percent of our GNP on defense.

For many years, the Soviets have been increasing their expenditures in military capability by at least four percent annually in real terms. In contrast, except for the Vietnam period, we were reducing our real defense spending year in and year out. Only recently have we turned the corner and, along with our NATO allies, made a commitment to a three percent annual real increase in the days ahead.

In assessing the impact of the Soviet buildup, there is room for healthy debate over rates, GNP percentages and even intentions. But there is no escaping the fact that the Soviets have for years continued to out-man, out-gun, out-build, and out-deploy us in most meaningful military categories, all the while shortening our qualitative lead in many important areas. I'd like to share with you my perceptions of what this means to the security of our nation.

On the one hand, the current balance between U.S. (and allied) and Soviet (and allied) military posture is reasonably good and generally perceived as such by the rest of the world. In fact, I believe our true relative capability today may be somewhat better than many people appreciate; we have a much clearer idea of our own limitations and weaknesses than we do of an adversary's and it is much harder to judge the precise location on trend lines than to discern the trends themselves.

On the other hand, I believe that those who draw unwarranted comfort from a contemporary "snapshot" of the current balance and discount the seriousness of these trends are missing the broader impact of the shifting balance on our future national security and international influence. However one assesses the balance today, there can be little doubt that it has shifted adversely, that the margin of U.S. military capability relative to that of the Soviet Union is narrower today than it has ever been, and that these trends are continuing. For the sake of brevity, I will mention only the key issues which underlie my personal concern.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

In the space of a few years, the United States has moved from a position of clear-cut superiority to our current position of essential equivalence. The Soviets are modernizing virtually every component of their strategic nuclear force structure behind the momentum of new systems which are in the field and in production.

They are deploying three new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the very large **SS-18** which can carry up to 10 high-yield warheads and deliver them with great accuracy. They are deploying new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and new SLBM submarines. They are continuing with the deployment of the BACKFIRE bomber which has some capability for intercontinental missions. In addition, they have a number of new ICBMs under development, as well as research and development in many other areas of strategic offensive capability.

They have a doctrine which considers nuclear war as thinkable and they are not only building their offensive forces, but are giving great attention to command and control, civil defense, air defense, and all other elements needed to fight a nuclear war.

On the other hand, our efforts have been very moderate. We have considered nuclear war as unthinkable and have generally directed our efforts towards a spasm war. Our force improvements have been very limited—some improvements to the **Minuteman,** development of cruise missiles which will be deployed on our aging bomber force in the 1980s, and a moderate modernization program for our submarine-launched ballistic missile force.

A decade or more of slips, reductions, and cancellations has retarded U.S. modernization appreciably and our ability to accelerate production enough in the short term to keep pace in the event of an unrestrained competition is questionable.

The Soviets have been outspending us in this area by a factor of between two and three for many years and they may well believe that they can achieve a margin of superiority over us in the early 1980s. It is now generally accepted by most defense analysts that, regardless of U.S. actions, Soviet strategic capability will increase relative to that of the U.S. through the mid-1980s, with or without a SALT agreement. Statistically, any margin may not be great, but a significant overall edge could have a profound influence, not only on the perceptions and apparent options open to decisionmakers in Washington and Moscow, but also on the policies and alignments of other nations.

A critical concern in this area is the impending threat to the survivability of our land-based ICBM force, a development which will impose serious strains upon the delicate structure of crisis stability in the early to mid-1980s. However, the broader threats to stability, in my view, are the overall size and asymmetrical momentum of modernization of both sides' strategic arsenals. I believe our objectives in arms control should be to continue to press for substantial reductions in strategic arms and to restrain the destabilizing pace and direction of Soviet weaponry.

These objectives can be realized only through a balanced strategy of negotiations and programs; whatever the outcome of the current round of negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, I

believe it will be essential to spend more on our strategic forces. The increase need not be as large with an equitable SALT agreement as without, but in either event, we will have to do more in this area. Of particular importance is a commitment to a program for a survivable ICBM.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The former clear-cut U.S. lead in theater nuclear capability has been overtaken by the Soviets. The implications of this vanished edge could become particularly serious in a NATO context.

There is convincing evidence that—in the absence of nuclear weapons—the Soviets might expect a better-than-even chance of gaining a quick victory in case of war in Europe. Our European allies consider a credible threat of escalation as an indispensable element of the NATO deterrent. NATO has long viewed theater nuclear weapons as both an essential leg of the "NATO Triad" (conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces) and a key element in assuring the credibility of the escalation option within NATO's flexible response strategy. However, given the state of essential equivalence in U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear forces and clear Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in conventional forces, the widening Soviet lead in long-range theater nuclear capability (such as the mobile MIRVed SS-20) is an added source of deep concern to defense planners in all NATO capitals.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The United States and its allies have never attempted to match the Soviet predilection for mass and numbers in conventional warfare. Rather, we have tended to rely upon the force multiplier effect of technologically superior forces to offset more numerous but relatively less sophisticated forces of potential opponents.

In recent years, however, Soviet quantitative advantages have persisted or widened while many of the key U.S. qualitative advantages have been systematically overtaken. This qualitative erosion is a consequence of an extensive Soviet research and development effort and a re-equipment program that has outpaced our own by a wide margin.

Soviet progress has been evident across the board. They are modernizing their ground forces with improved armor (new main battle tank), firepower (artillery with superior range and rate of fire), battlefield mobility (new armored infantry fighting vehicle) and air defense weapons, many of which match or exceed the sophistication of similar U.S. weapons. The Soviet navy has grown from essentially a coastal protection fleet to a highly effective, blue-water surface and subsurface force, supported by a growing force of modern, land- and sea-based naval aircraft and an increasing amphibious capability. Similarly, the character of Soviet air forces has changed from primarily an air defense force with limited offensive capability into a long range, high performance, high payload, offensively oriented air arm.

These Soviet advances are particularly worrisome in a NATO context in that the steadily growing Soviet edge in conventional and chemical warfare capability has for years been concentrated against Western European defense. NATO deployments are thin and uneven, our allies are short of munitions, interoperability problems persist, sea lines of communication are critical, and, even with increased prepositioning of combat equipment overseas, U.S. augmentation is limited by the size of our strategic airlift and sealift capability.

Even though NATO necessarily absorbs the majority of our attention, the challenges we face in other areas of the world are, in many cases, equally difficult. In the Pacific, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and even in our own hemisphere, for example, the United States has a wide variety of allies and interests which could or do require a measure of outside protection available only from U.S. resources. Yet our forward-deployed forces are fewer, our lines of communication longer and more fragile, the political climate less stable, and the military threat more diverse—if less acute—than in Western Europe.

Fortunately, the picture is not altogether negative. In Europe, NATO's Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) is a step in the right direction, and I believe it is critical to maintain this encouraging momentum through continued Alliance-wide modernization of conventional forces, increased weapons standardization and interoperability, and improved capability to conduct coalition warfare. In the Pacific, the new U.S. relationship with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) can be expected to improve long-term regional stability and could help lessen the likelihood of conflict in areas where U.S. interests are directly engaged. However, I believe these and other such measures must be recognized as but a beginning in redressing a world-wide balance which has been shifting for more than a decade, and much more needs to be done in the years ahead.

READINESS

Another area of concern is the disappearing cushion of time. For many years, the Soviets have been increasing the capability of their standing forces for short notice combat—a reflection of their doctrinal emphasis on shock and surprise. In the past, we have never been ready when war came, relying on a large acceleration lane to build up after an attack. In modern warfare, we do not have that luxury. The analogy I use is that we must view readiness not through binoculars—planning to "get well" by the end of a constantly receding Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) period—but

through bifocals—attentive to long-term fixes but concentrating on maximizing our capacity to fight with what we have today.

The recent mobilization and readiness exercise (**Nifty Nugget**) crystallized our appreciation of a number of problem areas in this regard. I have long espoused the philosophy that "Readiness Now" is the best insurance for the security of our country, and the **Nifty Nugget** results have confirmed my judgement that we have a great deal of work to do in order to update our near-term capability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain our combat forces.

Placing these disturbing military elements into the broader context of the global power balance, I would summarize the situation this way:

- There is too much pessimism about our current capability. I would not swap our present military capability with that of the Soviet Union, nor would I want to trade the broader problems each country faces.
- The Soviet system has neither the political appeal nor the economic vitality of the United States; the Soviet Union derives the majority of its influence in the world from the actual or potential use and deployment of its military power.
- The Soviets have usually experienced political setbacks and reverses in their efforts to exert influence abroad where the application of military pressure (direct or proxy) was either inappropriate or foreclosed.
- Although the Soviets traditionally have been very cautious in the direct use of their own military forces outside their immediate sphere of control, their present position of approximate strategic nuclear equality, with momentum toward a situation of possible overall military superiority, could create further incentives for greater risks.
- The greater the Soviet perception of freedom of action in the military realm, the greater the danger that they might attempt to exert the leverage of military power (threatened or used) in extending their economic, diplomatic, or ideological influence.

From my perspective, the bottom line of this rather somber accounting is that the Soviet Union depends for most of its world influence on massive military forces and power projection capability. This single-minded emphasis on military power threatens to upset the delicate balance of stability in the global power arena and, given the Soviet propensity to fish in troubled waters, could precipitate a confrontation which neither side wants. For example, I am seriously concerned about instability in the Persian Gulf, an area where vital U.S. interests are lodged; I would be even more concerned about such areas if the Soviet leadership were emboldened by a signficant margin of military superiority.

Based on these judgments, I am convinced that the central security challenge of the 1980s will be to deny the Soviets further incentives to pursue options based on a pre-

DATELINE: R&D

Mini-Laser Rangefinder

A technician at Hughes Aircraft Co.'s electro-optical and data systems group, Culver City, Calif., adjusts the boresight of a laser rangefinder for the U.S. Army's XM-1 main battle tank. The new "mini" rangefinder, designed to provide instantaneous range information to the tank's fire control computer, is smaller and more efficient than its predecessors. Under a $10-million contract, Hughes' production line will manufacture the first 110 laser rangefinders for delivery to Chrysler Corp., builder of the tank. Delivery of the first system is planned for October 1979. Hughes also is manufacturing an infrared night vision system and a fire detection system for the XM-1 tank.



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ponderance of military strength.

There are two approaches to this challenge, both of which involve our setting an example. One is the path of unilateral restraint, counting on the Soviets to follow suit. The other is to demonstrate that a continuing buildup by the Soviets would be counter-productive because, with our greater resources, we could and would match or surpass any capability they could mount.

In many ways, we have been following the path of unilateral restraint for some years, while the Soviets have continued a steady buildup. In effect, the Soviets have been rewarded by their behavior and I see nothing to suggest that continuing this approach will work any better in the future.

I am not suggesting that we should embark on a crash program. What I am suggesting—and have suggested to my civilian superiors—is that the United States has the material and moral resources to arrest and reverse the dangerous military trends discussed earlier, and that we will need to increase our defense spending in the years ahead, particularly in the area of strategic nuclear forces. I believe that, by demonstrating that we will not be surpassed, we can force the strategic competition with the Soviet Union away from the military sphere and toward areas where the risks of violence are less and the incentives for negotiated force reductions are greater.

In closing, I would suggest that increased U.S. defense spending should be only one element in a more confident and assertive national strategy. I believe this country has the wisdom and the vision to wield all the elements of its power in a constructive fashion, without being arrogant or provocative.

We should not regress to the tensions and confrontation of the Cold War, but neither should we permit present trends in Soviet capability and behavior to achieve by default in the 1980s what they could not accomplish by force or threat in the 1950s. I see little cause for optimism in the future unless the United States maintains both the power and the will to deter encroachment, defend our interests, and steer Soviet policy away from adventurism.

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CHANGE OF COMMAND

HONORS

Former Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, **George H. Mahon** (D-Texas) received the Distinguished Public Service Award from Navy Secretary **W. Graham Claytor Jr.**, for his outstanding service of 44 years in Congress, 39 years on the House Appropriations Committee, the last 14 as Committee Chairman.

ASSIGNMENTS

Gen. William A. Knowlton, USA, has been extended in his assignment as U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee, a post he has served in since August 1977.

Lt. Gen. Marion L. Boswell, USAF, Chief of Staff, Pacific Command, to Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, with the additional duty of Senior U.S. Air Force Member, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, effective June 1, 1979.

VAdm. Thomas J. Bigley, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), to Commander, Second Fleet.

VAdm. Wesley L. McDonald, USN, Commander, Second Fleet, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare).

RAdm. Carl T. Hanson, USN, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, becomes Director, Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also has been nominated for promotion to vice admiral.

RETIREMENTS

Lt. Gen. Abner B. Martin, USAF, Director, Defense Mapping Agency since September 1977, nominated for retirement in his current grade, effective July 1, 1979.

VAdm. Frederick C. Turner, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare), nominated for retirement in his current grade, effective July 1, 1979.



Gen. Knowlton

RAdm. Hanson

Lt. Gen. Martin

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